Air Crash Thread: Boeing MAX and Other Problems

That's a confusing article. This suggests that the 2 sensors are standard, but that the MCAS only listens to one.

I agree, now I'm not clear about how many AoA sensors there are on a vanilla MAX. You would expect two (one for each side of the cockpit in line with normal Boeing practice) but many articles suggest that MAX shipped with a single one. In any case MCAS was only reading from one... if two were available by default then that makes Boeing's oversight all the more serious and inexplicable.

Regardless, Ethiopia turned off the MCAS and still couldn't save the plane. The indicator lights would not have saved them, they knew what the problem was.

We know that MCAS switches itself back on if it continues to see "problems" which it certainly would with a damaged AoA sensor. The indicator lights may have saved them if they'd known that MCAS was coming back on and that an AoA disagree error was in progress. We can't say they couldn't have saved the plane in those circumstances.

This was what happened to EA, they couldn't release the yoke, but they also couldn't crank hard enough on the trim. The thumb tabs weren't available with MCAS off, and with MCAS on it was overridden.

The thumb tabs should be available when MCAS isn't in control and usually are. Unfortunately Boeing's checklist (in this thread) mandates a Stab Trim Cutout command for runaway stabilisers. That's why we can't know if the plane would still have crashed with the warning lights and with crew awareness of what MCAS was and what it could do - the crew would have known what the aircraft was trying to do.

As it is many Boeing pilots didn't know what MCAS could/might do, some airlines even thought they were flying with working warning options when they weren't (SouthWest are one such airline).
 
The thumb tabs should be available when MCAS isn't in control and usually are. Unfortunately Boeing's checklist (in this thread) mandates a Stab Trim Cutout command for runaway stabilisers. That's why we can't know if the plane would still have crashed with the warning lights and with crew awareness of what MCAS was and what it could do - the crew would have known what the aircraft was trying to do.

I responded to that.

We know that MCAS switches itself back on if it continues to see "problems" which it certainly would with a damaged AoA sensor. The indicator lights may have saved them if they'd known that MCAS was coming back on and that an AoA disagree error was in progress. We can't say they couldn't have saved the plane in those circumstances.

I think that the flight log from EA suggested that they themselves switched it back on in an effort to get the hydraulic trim actuation back, and back off again. I don't recall how many times they tried it. I was not aware that MCAS could re-activate itself after being switched off.
 

Yes, and as I said the Boeing procedure for "runaway stabiliser" is to switch of the electric trim. However, this stabiliser event isn't caused by a fault in the electronic actuation system that's present on MAX, -400 and -800 aircraft, it's MCAS that's causing the stabiliser to move. Arguably it isn't runaway at all... but there's no way for the pilots to know that. Unfortunately it's also the only method that Boeing provided to "switch off" MCAS, something that demonstrates how badly though through the MCAS implementation was (in my opinion).

I was not aware that MCAS could re-activate itself after being switched off.

I think @Dotini posted this link some time ago, but here it is again. MCAS can (and will) switch itself back on if it continues to think that its intervention is needed.

And, as we've discussed before, there was no reason for the pilots to think that MCAS itself was problematic, many Boeing pilots (including those in US operators) were still not fully aware of what MCAS was and how it was operating. We're using a lot of coulda woulda shoulda hindsight to judge how they should have reacted when faced with a fatally difficult situation in an out-of-control plane.
 
Boeing is starting to settle cases with the victims' families. In the Lion Air cases the estimated settlement is ~$1.2M to $3M, depending on if the victims were married and the number of children. In addition, Boeing is paying $144,500 from its financial assistance fund.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...least-12-million-apiece-sources-idUSKBN1WA1VD

CHICAGO/JAKARTA (Reuters) - Boeing Co has settled the first claims stemming from the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX in Indonesia, a U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyer said, and three other sources said that families of those killed will receive at least $1.2 million apiece.

Floyd Wisner of Wisner Law Firm said he has settled 11 of his 17 claims against Boeing on behalf of families who lost their relatives when a brand-new MAX crashed into the Java Sea on Oct. 29 soon after take-off, killing all 189 aboard.

Boeing spokesman Gordon Johndroe declined comment. Boeing did not admit liability in its 11 settlements, Wisner said.

The claims, each representing one victim, are the first to be settled out of some 55 lawsuits against Boeing in U.S. federal court in Chicago and could set the bar for mediation talks by other Lion Air plaintiffs’ lawyers that are scheduled through next month, three people familiar with the matter said.

Wisner said he could not disclose the amount of the settlements because of a confidentiality agreement with Boeing. The three people familiar with the matter said families of Lion Air victims, who were nearly all from Indonesia, are set to receive at least $1.2 million each. That amount would be for a single victim without any dependents.

The people spoke on condition of anonymity because the negotiations are confidential.

Boeing’s shares rose as much as 2 percent on Wednesday. Awards can vary according to victims’ nationality, age, marital status, income, dependents and life expectancy. The Lion Air victims were mainly from Indonesia, where incomes and crash awards tend to be lower than in the United States.

The manufacturer is also facing nearly 100 lawsuits over an Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX crash on March 10 that killed 157 people on its way from Addis Ababa to Nairobi.

Lawsuits over both crashes highlight the role of MCAS automated software that pushed the nose of the two planes lower. They claim that design flaws allowed erroneous sensor data to set off the automated system and overwhelm pilots.

The Lion Air lawsuits are being mediated before Donald O’Connell, a retired judge of the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois, a jurisdiction often used for air accidents situated in Chicago, where Boeing is based.

‘COMMON LINK’
Lawyers for the Ethiopian Airlines crash are pushing for a jury trial in U.S. federal court in Chicago, demanding to know why Boeing allowed the 737 MAX to go on flying after the Lion Air incident.

The planemaker has said it is sorry for the lives lost in both crashes but has stopped short of admitting any fault in how it developed the 737 MAX or the software.

It has said the two crashes - like most air disasters - were caused by a chain of events, with a common link between the two MAX accidents being “erroneous activation” of MCAS.

In the Lion Air case, families of victims who were married with one to three children could receive between $2 million and $3 million, the people said.

Industry veteran Wisner said he had settled lawsuits for other plane crashes that took place in Indonesia in years prior to the Lion Air 737 MAX crash for around $500,000 or $600,000. He will receive one third of his Lion Air settlements in fees. The settlements come on top of $144,500 that Boeing is paying out of a $50 million financial assistance fund it set up in July for families of victims of the two crashes. Any settlement or jury award in the Ethiopian cases is likely to be larger than for Lion Air, the people said.

Many of the Ethiopian crash victims, who came from 35 different countries, included United Nations employees and young working adults in their twenties or thirties. There were nine U.S. citizens among the victims. Boeing is also the target of a U.S. Department of Justice criminal investigation into the development of the 737 MAX. The 737 MAX has been grounded worldwide following the Ethiopian crash while Boeing develops software updates and new pilot training. It has already estimated a cost of more than $8 billion from the grounding, mainly due to production setbacks and compensation it will owe airlines that have canceled thousands of flights as they manage schedules without the fuel-efficient jetliner they had counted on.

Boeing has said it hopes the 737 MAX jetliner will fly again in the United States early in the final quarter of this year.

Reporting by Tracy Rucinski in Chicago and Jessica Damiana in Jakarta; Additional reporting by Bernadette Christina in Jakarta and Tim Hepher in Paris; Editing by Noeleen Walder and Howard Goller


https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20190925/business/309259911
CHICAGO -- A Chicago law firm says it has settled lawsuits against Boeing on behalf of the families of 11 passengers killed in the crash of a Lion Air jet off the coast of Indonesia.

It's believed to be the first settlement in the nearly 100 lawsuits filed against Boeing after the October 2018 accident and another crash involving a Boeing 737 Max jet in March in Ethiopia.

Attorney Alexandra Wisner said Wednesday that the settlements were reached last month. She declined to discuss financial terms.

Wisner, who said her firm has six other lawsuits still pending, said Boeing did not admit liability.

Boeing, based in Chicago, declined to comment.

Plaintiffs in the Lion Air cases agreed to enter mediation with Boeing. Families of passengers who died in the second crash, involving an Ethiopian Airlines Max, did not. In all, 346 people died in the crashes.

Separately, Boeing said Wednesday that it has created a new organization to investigate safety-related concerns by employees and established a safety committee on its board of directors.

Those and other changes follow a five-month review by Boeing's board after the two accidents. Boeing faces criminal and civil investigations by the Justice Department, Congress and the Transportation Department.

The Max has been grounded since March while Boeing makes changes to flight-control systems implicated in the crashes. Boeing hopes regulators allow airlines to resume flying the plane later this year.
 
Boeing is starting to settle cases with the victims' families. In the Lion Air cases the estimated settlement is ~$1.2M to $3M, depending on if the victims were married and the number of children. In addition, Boeing is paying $144,500 from its financial assistance fund.

Interestingly this does not preclude a further (and final) settlement.

Meanwhile, here's the new NTSB document that my earlier post referenced. I couldn't read it before as the NTSB seemed to be experiencing high traffic. @Danoff, it's evident that two AoA sensors were indeed fitted.
 
Yes, and as I said the Boeing procedure for "runaway stabiliser" is to switch of the electric trim. However, this stabiliser event isn't caused by a fault in the electronic actuation system that's present on MAX, -400 and -800 aircraft, it's MCAS that's causing the stabiliser to move. Arguably it isn't runaway at all... but there's no way for the pilots to know that. Unfortunately it's also the only method that Boeing provided to "switch off" MCAS, something that demonstrates how badly though through the MCAS implementation was (in my opinion).

I don't see how they could have used the hydraulic system to move the trim. While the electric stabilizer is on, they can't use it because the MCAS will move it. With it off, it's fully loaded when they're pulling because because of their altitude. I don't see what you think they should have done.

I think @Dotini posted this link some time ago, but here it is again. MCAS can (and will) switch itself back on if it continues to think that its intervention is needed.

Crazy.

And, as we've discussed before, there was no reason for the pilots to think that MCAS itself was problematic, many Boeing pilots (including those in US operators) were still not fully aware of what MCAS was and how it was operating. We're using a lot of coulda woulda shoulda hindsight to judge how they should have reacted when faced with a fatally difficult situation in an out-of-control plane.

I'm just basing what I'm saying off of what we know of the EA pilot responses. They did everything they were supposed to do (as far as I know). I still don't understand how your scenario could have saved them. As far as i know they had no options.
 
I don't see how they could have used the hydraulic system to move the trim. While the electric stabilizer is on, they can't use it because the MCAS will move it. With it off, it's fully loaded when they're pulling because because of their altitude. I don't see what you think they should have done.

What I'm saying is that the current (or previous) procedure during a runaway stabiliser scenarion caused by MCAS is to disconnect the electrical trim functions. This means that neither MCAS nor the pilot can operate them. As we know, at this point in the emergency MCAS has probably trimmed to such an extent that the physical controller alone will not have enough leverage to balance the trim.

To my mind this is a grave flaw in itself. I think we'll see MCAS being disconnectable (i.e. a software "off" switch) without the pilots losing the ability to trim electrically.

I'm just basing what I'm saying off of what we know of the EA pilot responses. They did everything they were supposed to do (as far as I know). I still don't understand how your scenario could have saved them. As far as i know they had no options.

Making the optional warnings a standard fitting would have given the pilots more information about the situation the plane was in. I'm not saying they could have definitely saved it but clearly more accurate information is better in any emergency, particularly one where the plane is automating itself into an unrecoverable envelope. My point was that nor can we say that they couldn't have saved it. Pilot overload in emergency callout situations can only be mitigated by repetitive, intense simulation training. Sadly Boeing hadn't provided this, not even to high value airlines like Ethiopian Air. What we do know from the test pilot situations is that the MCAS failure can be saved in extreme circumstances but that the pilots need to know very quickly what's happening. To my mind that leads to the possibility that standardising the error information on the PFD would have given the pilots a better chance.
 
Cracks have been found in a "heavily-used" Boeing NG* leading the FAA to mandate particular inspections of the type by all operators. I don't think there's much genuine cause for alarm (any enhanced inspection regime is always a good thing) but this isn't the kind of headline that Boeing need right now.


Next Generation, the -700, -800 and -900 models,
 
Cracks have been found in a "heavily-used" Boeing NG* leading the FAA to mandate particular inspections of the type by all operators. I don't think there's much genuine cause for alarm (any enhanced inspection regime is always a good thing) but this isn't the kind of headline that Boeing need right now.


Next Generation, the -700, -800 and -900 models,
Boeing: Oops...
 
I'm sure glad I didn't see that before my 3-hour flight back home yesterday. :embarrassed:
 
Cracks in aircraft with high cycle counts are a problem that has been around for decades, and will continue as long as aircraft are made out of aluminum. It is pretty much a non-issue that is dealt with by more inspections and repairs that must be re-inspected usually based of flight cycles or flight hours.

Also, the oldest 737 NG models are from the late 1990's, so it really does not surprise me that they are getting to the age where fatigue cracks start popping up.
 
Cracks have been found in a "heavily-used" Boeing NG* leading the FAA to mandate particular inspections of the type by all operators. I don't think there's much genuine cause for alarm (any enhanced inspection regime is always a good thing) but this isn't the kind of headline that Boeing need right now.


Next Generation, the -700, -800 and -900 models,

Further to this it seems that the cracks are in the "pickle forks", part of the assembly that attaches the wing to the fuselage. They're supposed to take 90,000 cycles without failure, that's the entire lifetime of the aircraft.
 
I have a friend who works for Ryanair, who have an exclusive fleet of 737-800s, and this was news to her. Maybe only certain operators or planes from a particular production cycle have been contacted.
 
I have a friend who works for Ryanair, who have an exclusive fleet of 737-800s, and this was news to her. Maybe only certain operators or planes from a particular production cycle have been contacted.
The story mentions an FAA warning. Would Ryanair come under their jurisdiction?
 
The story mentions an FAA warning. Would Ryanair come under their jurisdiction?

No, but I was wondering if other operators outside of the United States would have at least been contacted because the planes were manufactured in the US.

As @Liquid says the FAA have addressed the directive to Boeing (who are the ones who reported the cracks on an aircraft they were overhauling). Boeing then have to tell all the aircraft operators.
 
There is breaking news of a very ugly nature that is sure to affect the 737-MAX situation. Boeing stock is plummeting and CNBC analysts are declaiming that Muilenburg is toast. It is at the tweets level now, but I'm sure will be in print shortly. One media figure has alleged there is an internecine criminal investigation underway inside the executive branch.

Edit:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...e-misled-faa-on-737-max-sources-idUSKBN1WX25G
David Shepardson

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) turned over instant messages from 2016 between two employees that suggest the airplane maker may have misled the Federal Aviation Administration about a key safety system on the grounded 737 MAX, according to documents seen by Reuters.

The FAA confirmed Friday that Boeing told it a day earlier about internal messages it had discovered “some months ago” that characterize “certain communications with the FAA during the original certification of the 737 MAX in 2016.”

The FAA said it found the messages “concerning” and “is reviewing this information to determine what action is appropriate.” It prompted a letter from FAA Administrator Steve Dickson to Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg demanding an “immediate” explanation for the delay in turning over the documents.

A person briefed on the matter said Boeing failed to turn over the documents to the FAA for four months and that the Justice Department is also in possession of the messages.

The Boeing internal messages raised questions about the performance of the so-called MCAS anti-stall system that has been tied to the two fatal crashes in five months.

The messages are between the MAX’s then-chief technical pilot, Mark Forkner, and another Boeing pilot, the sources said, and raised questions about the MCAS’s performance in the simulator in which he said it was “running rampant.”

Forkner has since left Boeing. The Seattle Times reported in September that Forkner repeatedly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to not turn over documents subpoenaed by the Justice Department.

Boeing said in a statement the company “brought to the Committee’s attention a document containing statements by a former Boeing employee.”

Forkner said in one text message, “I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).” The other employee responded that “it wasn’t a lie, no one told us that was the case” of an issue with MCAS.

Forkner responded soon after: “Granted I suck at flying, but even this was egregious.”


The FAA plans to turn over more communications from Forkner to Congress later on Friday, sources said.

Boeing is revising the 737 MAX software to add more safeguards and require the MCAS system to receive input from two key sensors.

The FAA reiterated that it is “following a thorough process, not a prescribed timeline, for returning the Boeing 737 MAX to passenger service. The agency will lift the grounding order only after we have determined the aircraft is safe.”

Earlier this week, Southwest Airlines Co (LUV.N) delayed the return of the plane to its flight schedule until February.


Separately, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee confirmed it will question Muilenburg at an Oct. 29 hearing, one day before a House of Representatives panel is scheduled to question him.

Boeing shares fell 3.9% after the Reuters report, helping to drag down the Dow Jones industrial average .DJI to a session low.

Federal prosecutors aided by the FBI, the Department of Transportation’s inspector general and several blue-ribbon panels are investigating the 737 MAX’s certification.
 
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I think I heard the Chief Technical Pilot's text message was perhaps known to management well before the 2nd crash. It's no wonder he has gone incommunicado, as terrible criminal liability appears in play.

edit:
 
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A big week for Boeing in the timeline of the investigation. Kevin McAllister, Boeing's chief executive, followed Mullenberg (board chairman) and was removed from his position on Tuesday. Today families of the Lion Air crash victims have been briefed on the crash report which is published in full on Friday.

Design and process errors in the MCAS system are a contributing factor, something that won't be much of a surprise to people who've followed this thread and the wider news. Obviously we have to wait for the full report to see how large a part MCAS is thought to have played, and this report won't necessarily shed light on the Ethiopian Air crash.

BBC
According to reports, families have been told that there were incorrect assumptions about how the MCAS control system would behave and that the "deficiencies" had been highlighted during training.

Slides from the briefing to the families showed that there was a lack of documentation about how a "stick shaker" - warning pilots of a loss of lift - would work.
 
I think I heard the Chief Technical Pilot's text message was perhaps known to management well before the 2nd crash. It's no wonder he has gone incommunicado, as terrible criminal liability appears in play.

edit:

The allegations seem to be refuted by expert reporting from the Seattle Times.
Boeing’s defense of 737 MAX’s flight-control system in wake of pilot messages stands up
Oct. 21, 2019 at 8:16 pm Updated Oct. 22, 2019 at 9:23 am
Boeing 737 MAX jets were parked on a closed runway at Paine Field in Everett this summer as the company awaited FAA approval to resume commercial... (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times) More


By
Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter


After the release Friday of an instant message chat between two senior Boeing pilots, the jet maker faced skepticism when, two days later, it denied it had suppressed what seemed like early evidence that its 737 MAX flight control system had “run rampant” during simulator testing in 2016.

But Boeing’s defense stands up, according to three sources who spoke to the Seattle Times on Monday — two citing direct knowledge of inside information about the matter and the third an expert pilot from outside the company analyzing the flight details in the chat.

The bottom line is that the erratic behavior described in the 2016 chat by 737 MAX chief technical pilot Mark Forkner revealed a software bug in the MAX flight simulator he was using, a pilot training machine that he and his colleagues were then fine-tuning to get it ready for the MAX’s entry into service.

It was not evidence of the flaws that later showed up on the real airplane’s new flight-control system — known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — that caused the fatal crashes of the jets in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

The question is important because the release of the messages sparked a furor with members of Congress and regulators, raising new doubts about Boeing’s integrity and transparency just as it prepares to seek approval to put the long-grounded MAX back into commercial service.

A former senior pilot at Boeing, who worked with Forkner in a similar role and who has direct knowledge of the type of simulator evaluations that Forkner was preparing at that time, said that the flight parameters mentioned in the chat indicate clearly that MCAS could not possibly have been engaging, even though the simulator faults made it seem so.


Furthermore, he added, it would have been impossible for Forkner to have been flying in the simulator any pattern similar to the accident flights, in both of which MCAS was triggered by a faulty angle of attack signal.

“I can tell you 100%, he couldn’t have been flying the scenario that occurred on the accident airplanes, because there was no physical way in that simulator to shut off one angle of attack sensor,” said the senior pilot, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he doesn’t wish to be drawn into the Department of Justice’s ongoing criminal investigation of the 737 MAX.

737 MAX CRISIS |
COMPLETE COVERAGE »
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Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer and former fighter pilot who now is an analyst with Leeham.net and who has publicly criticized the MCAS design, concurred that the altitude and airspeed Forkner cited when the simulator flight controls went haywire rule out a real engagement of MCAS and indicate instead a glitch in the simulator.

“He was in normal flight. What’s wrong with the original MCAS design is not apparent when flying normally,” said Fehrm. “That said to me, this is just a simulator implementation issue.”

The problem Forkner identified in the simulator “was logged contemporaneously” apart from his chat messages, according to a third source familiar with the relevant documents, and Boeing afterward fixed the simulator software.

“The issue was not experienced in later sessions,” said this source, who also asked for anonymity because he’s involved in one of the MAX investigations. “The issue could not be re-created in mid-December.”

PR disaster


Boeing faced an epic public-relations disaster last Friday when a congressional committee released the text of the chat, in which Forkner described to his colleague Patrik Gustavsson a MAX simulator session that day in mid-November 2016 when MCAS started pushing the nose down, or “trimming” the jet.

“It’s running rampant in the sim on me,” Forkner wrote. “I’m levelling off at like 4000 ft, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like craxy (sic). I’m like, WHAT?”

“Granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious,” Forkner added.

Forkner also stated that since MCAS had evolved from its initial design and now —”Shocker AlerT,” as he put it — activates at low speed as well as in the originally intended high-speed scenarios, he “basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).”

The disclosure understandably drew outrage from members of Congress, airline pilot unions and aviation experts who interpreted it as clear evidence that Boeing knew before the MAX entered passenger service that MCAS could behave erratically and dangerously.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not been informed of the document, which Boeing had provided to the Department of Justice last February, the month before the second MAX crash. On Friday, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson sent an angry letter to Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg demanding an explanation.


Both Fehrm and the former senior Boeing pilot also initially reacted with dismay, until they read the transcript of the chat. Then their knowledge of flying and of the way simulators are developed led both to a different conclusion.



Technical pilots versus test pilots


Forkner was chief technical pilot on the 737, managing pilots in a group called Flight Technical and Safety within Boeing’s customer services division. This is a separate group from the test pilots who fly the planes under development, who are part of a different corporate division: Boeing Test and Evaluation.

As Forkner’s chat makes clear, the two don’t necessarily communicate well. “The test pilots have kept us out of the loop,” Gustavsson complains at one point.



https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...sed-erratic-behavior-cited-in-pilot-messages/
 
The allegations seem to be refuted by expert reporting from the Seattle Times.

It seems that the article is about allegations centering around the performance of MCAS in the simulator, and the performance of the simulator itself? It remains to be seen whether or not simulator findings are a part of Friday's report and to what extent. I don't believe we know what Boeing's defence is at this point, or if they're even going to offer one. For now they seem to be mostly in mea culpa mode and concentrating on an image of learning and moving forward.

Pilots who are speaking to the press but not investigators? I would have thought that most pilots with something that informs the case would actively pursue the opportunity to speak to investigators on the record. Wouldn't you?

EDIT: Boeing expect MAX to fly again by the New Year.
 
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I suppose to be seen as doing something, Boeing has fired a top executive. Though exactly what he had to do with any of the problems is not immediately clear.
Kevin McAllister ousted as boss of Boeing Commercial Airplanes as 737 MAX crisis continues
Oct. 22, 2019 at 1:20 pm Updated Oct. 22, 2019 at 7:38 pm
Dominic Gates
and
Steve Miletich
Seattle Times staff reporters


The first Boeing executive head to roll as a result of the ongoing 737 MAX crisis is that of Kevin McAllister. The Boeing board decided to fire him as boss of Boeing Commercial Airplanes at a board meeting Monday in San Antonio and disclosed the move Tuesday.

McAllister was replaced immediately by Stan Deal, chief executive of Boeing’s services division and formerly a longtime executive within the Seattle-area commercial jet division. On Tuesday at the division’s headquarters at Longacres, where the move came as a surprise, Deal was already installed.

A senior Boeing executive with knowledge of the deliberations, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issues, said McAllister was fired for a combination of negative developments “on his watch.”

The major issue has been the grounding of the 737 MAX and the constant pushing out of its return to service as Boeing has struggled to meet the demands of international regulators. As a result, Boeing’s stock has lost one-fifth of its value since the second MAX crash in March.

737 MAX CRISIS

09112019_boing_tzr_085515-780x501.jpg

COMPLETE COVERAGE »
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The senior executive cited other issues, including the 777X engine problems that have pushed first flight into next year and the recent blowout of a door that happened during ground testing of that jet. Another factor, he said, was this month’s discovery in older 737s of cracks in the so-called “pickle fork” structure connecting the wings to the fuselage — although it’s difficult to see how McAllister is responsible for faults in airplanes built long before he got there. And the shrinking backlog of the 787 Dreamliner is also a concern.

When McAllister arrived at Boeing exactly three years ago, his immediate priority was to work toward the launch of the jetmaker’s next all-new airplane that was to become the 797. On the drawing board was a concept called the New Midmarket Airplane (NMA), a jet with a size and range in between the single-aisle 737 and the twin-aisle 787 Dreamliner.


Also of prime importance was to get the new 777X in the air, flight tested and delivered to customers.

Those ambitions have been derailed.

The 777X is delayed by the engine and other problems. Sales of the smaller model, the 777-8X, have not materialized and production of that model has been pushed out. Meanwhile, it’s possible launch customer Emirates may cancel some of its large 777X order next month at the Dubai Air Show.

And the MAX crisis has pushed the NMA decision into the future. Deal may have to radically revise that product strategy after the MAX is back in service.

McAllister, 56, originally a materials engineer, joined Boeing in 2016 after he’d spent 28 years at GE. He was the first outsider appointed to lead Boeing’s commercial jet division. Boeing executives who had worked with him at GE knew him as less of a people person than “a math guy” who made decisions after carefully running the numbers.

Since the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX a year ago triggered the crisis that led in March to the grounding of the worldwide fleet, McAllister’s boss in Chicago, Dennis Muilenburg, has taken the lead on all public statements about the MAX and McAllister has said remarkably little in public.

One of his few comments came in an email to The Seattle Times ahead of the Paris Air Show in June, when he said he was going through “the most trying time I have encountered in 30-plus years in this industry.”


On Tuesday, Muilenburg said in a statement, “We’re grateful to Kevin for his dedicated and tireless service to Boeing, its customers and its communities during a challenging time, and for his commitment to support this transition.”

David Calhoun, who took over as Boeing chairman when the board stripped Muilenburg of that role this month, said, “the Boeing board fully supports these leadership moves.”

“Boeing will emerge stronger than ever from its current challenges and the changes we’re making throughout Boeing will benefit the flying public well into the future,” Calhoun said in a statement.



In a parting message in the press release, McAllister said, “Boeing is a great company with a commitment to safety I have seen firsthand.”

In Boeing’s annual disclosure of executive compensation in March, McAllister — though head of the division that pulled in two thirds of total company profits — was not listed because he was not among the five highest-paid executives.

A filing at the end of February showed McAllister then owned 125,595 Boeing shares, today worth more than $42 million. However, 100,000 of those shares, awarded to him when he joined the company, are not yet vested. Boeing did not disclose the financial terms of his departure or whether he would retain those shares.


Deal, 55, joined Boeing in 1986 after earning a Bachelor of Science degree in aerospace engineering from the University of Illinois.

He has led the Dallas-based Boeing Global Services division since it was created in July 2017. Before that he spent most of his Boeing career at the commercial jet unit in the Puget Sound region, where he led the Commercial Aviation Services unit and before that the Supplier Management organization.

Ted Colbert, who was Boeing’s chief information officer and led the company’s IT infrastructure, takes over from Deal as head of Boeing Global Services. Vishwa Uddanwadiker was appointed to Colbert’s former role as interim chief information officer.

McAllister’s may not be the last Boeing head to roll as a result of the MAX crisis. CEO Muilenburg is under intense scrutiny, and the senior executive said his performance when he testifies before Congress on Oct. 30 will be pivotal in determining his future.

In that testimony, Muilenburg expects to affirm the MAX’s return to service before year end, the executive said.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...ercial-airplanes-as-737-max-crisis-continues/
 
I suppose to be seen as doing something, Boeing has fired a top executive. Though exactly what he had to do with any of the problems is not immediately clear.

I referenced that a few posts ago. As I said, I think Boeing are taking some blame at this point. Given that the Lion Air families have been briefed today I presume that Boeing will have had a similar briefing earlier week. Ditching the CE may well be part of their strategy to accept blame, identify individuals and visibly clean house.
 
Design and process errors in the MCAS system are a contributing factor, something that won't be much of a surprise to people who've followed this thread and the wider news.

The thing is, the design problems wouldn't really be such a big deal (or even the crashes) if it weren't for any kind of internal cover-up. It's always the cover-up...
 
I suppose to be seen as doing something, Boeing has fired a top executive. Though exactly what he had to do with any of the problems is not immediately clear.
If something happens within a corporation good/bad, known/unknown, it's always the fault of the top.
 
I'm still digesting the 322-page report but here's my summary:

  • Engineering issues on the aircraft had not been correctly resolved, this led to a situation where MCAS could consider it necessary to intervene (although it was not)
  • MCAS activated many times and was overridden by manual control inputs
  • Communication between Captain and First Officer was poor
  • First Officer had weaknesses highlighted in previous training, may have been mentally overloaded in the alarm-rich emergency environment, evidently couldn't remember statutory "memory" items
  • Aircraft did not have AoA Disagree sensor, this facility would have allowed engineering or flight crew to diagnose full problem correctly
  • Most damningly the training and documentation provided by Boeing for such disagree situations (with or without AoA) on MCAS aircraft is described as "inadequate"
I've probably missed things and will come back to edit this post, but I think that's pretty much the overview. There were various problems around the AoA sensors and the flight data computer that had led to two previous flights exhibiting warning issues in the cockpit. Fortunately MCAS didn't play a significant role in those. In the final flight, after the flaps were retracted, it did.

http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018 - 035 - PK-LQP Final Report.pdf
 
If something happens within a corporation good/bad, known/unknown, it's always the fault of the top.

Generally

It sounds like there was a push for profitability and getting the MAX to market as fast as possible. It all flows from the top. People fail under pressure to meet the deadline and you end up with this.
 
Generally

It sounds like there was a push for profitability and getting the MAX to market as fast as possible. It all flows from the top. People fail under pressure to meet the deadline and you end up with this.

Boeing "made mistakes", Muilenberg tells the Senate Commerce Committee. BBC.
 
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