Human Rights

[Keef]

I can't find any of this in the QRH so I guess my point is that I'm not understanding this argument about "the public can't vote away rights". They certainly can although not directly. Obviously if something like that were put on the ballot directly it would probably be struck down before it ever came to a vote. But it eventually does come to a vote on the floor of Congress via elected officials, and we know damn well that many Americans are single-issue voters attempting to vote as directly as they possibly can on their favorite issue/candidate.

I say if we can't legally go after people trying to do this then we should certainly shame them in public for bad behavior. People like Margot Robie or whatever her name is should be put on TV way more often so we can all point and laugh. Margaret Thatcher. MGK.

 

[Danoff]

I can't find any of this in the QRH so I guess my point is that I'm not understanding this argument about "the public can't vote away rights". They certainly can although not directly. Obviously if something like that were put on the ballot directly it would probably be struck down before it ever came to a vote. But it eventually does come to a vote on the floor of Congress via elected officials, and we know damn well that many Americans are single-issue voters attempting to vote as directly as they possibly can on their favorite issue/candidate.

I say if we can't legally go after people trying to do this then we should certainly shame them in public for bad behavior. People like Margot Robie or whatever her name is should be put on TV way more often so we can all point and laugh. Margaret Thatcher. MGK.

I guess there are two versions of "rights" to consider. One is natural rights, and the other is legal rights. Either could be referenced when talking about "human rights". Natural rights are not affected by law. There is no plurality of the people or legal codification that can alter natural rights in any form. Law can and does violate natural rights, but it only highlights a problem with the law.

Legal rights are, I believe, what Ayn Rand is talking about in her quote, as natural rights are too obviously unaffected by law or pluralities. She says "the political function of rights" which suggests that she's not talking about natural rights but political (legal) rights. Clearly there are many instances where the legal rights of the individual can indeed be voted away by the majority - so what she's arguing is that this should not be allowed. Majorities or pluralities should not be able to vote away legal rights, precisely because they exist to function as a protection against a majority will. It's supposed to be something you're entitled to regardless of the will of the people around you - this is practically by definition.

So while it is possible to indirectly affect the rights of people via Constitutional Amendment in the US, it is hard, very hard. Not done by a simple majority. This is to facilitate exactly what Ayn Rand is saying - that it is the function of rights to protect people from the will of the majority. In the case of a rogue supreme court, willing to mess around with human rights on its own, it turns out that a majority, or even minority, can manage to influence the protections of some rights in the US. And that is very problematic for the very reason she highlights.

Her point is to remind people that some things should not be up for vote. They are beyond democracy, and they need to be beyond democracy.

 

[Keef]

They are beyond democracy, and they need to be beyond democracy.

Unfortunately that currently means that both sensible gun control and publicly accessible healthcare are beyond democracy. The needs of modern society are the complete opposite of what was given to us and most of us don't want to keep it. We can't get rid of stupid rights and we can't gain one's we need. Progress is being blockaded by a bunch of moonshiners with dirty feet and it's really bending us over.

 

[Danoff]

Unfortunately that currently means that both sensible gun control and publicly accessible healthcare are beyond democracy. The needs of modern society are the complete opposite of what was given to us and most of us don't want to keep it. We can't get rid of stupid rights and we can't gain one's we need. The whole system is really bending us over.

The 2nd amendment (by the Supreme Court's interpretation) leaves much more room for gun control, way more than the NRA would have you believe. That being said, the 2nd amendment is best understood as an instantiation of a natural right to self-defense (again, as the Supreme Court interprets it).

I'm not sure why publicly accessible healthcare is banned by human rights. We have that in the form of Medicare and Medicaid already.

 

[HenrySwanson]

What constitutes "a human" depends on what you're going to do with that term. Your purpose will determine the characteristics you're interested in for defining "a human". I would at least say that "a human" needs to be clearly separable from some other entity. Claiming that an implanted embryo is "a human" is somewhat problematic in that it is physically attached to "a human", and you'd need to make an argument that it isn't all one entity - the pregnant woman. And that the two are meaningfully separable for your purposes. Keep in mind that different DNA is present within the woman both well before and during pregnancy. In a very literal sense, it does become "one" at birth. At least differentiable from the (no longer) pregnant woman, if not from the bacteria within it.

If you're using the phrase "a human" in court, you're going to define it differently than a medical journal. And each of these definitions may not be compatible with the definition in a moral discussion.

This is a moral discussion.

I think the biological definition is kinda germane since we proceed on the ethics from there. We can acknowledge that they are all human lives, but the importance we place on them alters depending on other factors.

I think this question was answered and you commented on the answer next.

I'm being a tad slow - could you highlight where?

I don't know the important characteristics of your debilitated stroke patient that are needed to answer the question. In terms of individuals with a non-functioning brain, we often harvest their organs for others and let them die. I don't see much reason to put most, if not all, of the stages of embryo/fetal development at or below the cognitive abilities of a human in a vegetative state. But it's outside of my expertise to split hairs on that. I'd need to know more about both vegetative humans and fetal brain development to properly answer the question.

...and I'm completely fine with that.

Say we've got a patient who can only say the words "screw you". His eyes track your movement, he can swallow food and drink but he is doubly incontinent. Would it be ethical to include him in research that didn't have the potential to better his prognosis?

Something more current, what's your take on this story:

Backlash over idea to use 'brain dead' women for surrogate pregnancies

"There is no obvious medical reason why initiating such pregnancies would not be possible"

www.cosmopolitan.com

I already commented on this. It requires a different line in the sand, but my expectation is that the line in the sand is drawn quite late. Possibly even after 9 months of development - especially if it turns out that a longer gestational period is beneficial to the fetus, but even if that is not the case. I don't consider it to be any messier than today.

You don't see how this could get messy? For now we base a lot of rights on birth but that whole argument will be harder (impossible?) to stick to when we allow foetal development/"gestateling" growth ex utero.

It was a singular statement relevant to nothing other than the revival of this thread and therefore not indicative of any misunderstanding.

Fair enough

The discussion was moved because it was less to do with abortion than with artificial gestation. That's fine. Abortion is the termination of pregnancy and gestation outside an organism isn't pregnancy, whether termination of that gestation is wrong notwithstanding.

The other thread has been shown to exist in part to counter the stupid things people say on the subject, which they may still say.

Honestly I thought I'd post it here because people might get confused when talking about human lives and the right to life, and was also interested in where we'd consider the genesis of rights occurs given the advancement of technology.

Your assertion of ectogenesis not being pregnancy led me to an interesting paper analysing the ethics around the gestateling and its development, and whether it is ectogenesis or ectogestation.

 

[Danoff]

I think the biological definition is kinda germane since we proceed on the ethics from there. We can acknowledge that they are all human lives, but the importance we place on them alters depending on other factors.

I don't see why we "proceed on ethics from there". There is no semantic trick that's going to work here. What you're arguing is that there is something morally significant about a single cell, and you're trying to do it without point out what the significance is. Instead, you're appealing to conventions or other creatures, or inheritance. Anything except what it actually is, because as best I can tell you have absolutely no real reason why there is something morally significant about a single cell. I can tell because you've not even tried to explain that.

You can't define your way out of this. You can't convention your way out of it. You need to address the problem head-on, which is that it's a single cell and there's nothing morally significant about it. The problem you keep running into is that you have nothing to address it with.

That's the time when you need to re-think your position.

I'm being a tad slow - could you highlight where?

Here:

I don't know the important characteristics of your debilitated stroke patient that are needed to answer the question. In terms of individuals with a non-functioning brain, we often harvest their organs for others and let them die. I don't see much reason to put most, if not all, of the stages of embryo/fetal development at or below the cognitive abilities of a human in a vegetative state. But it's outside of my expertise to split hairs on that. I'd need to know more about both vegetative humans and fetal brain development to properly answer the question.

...and I'm completely fine with that.

Say we've got a patient who can only say the words "screw you". His eyes track your movement, he can swallow food and drink but he is doubly incontinent. Would it be ethical to include him in research that didn't have the potential to better his prognosis?

That's obviously not a person in a vegetative state. So I have no idea why you'd bring that up.

Something more current, what's your take on this story:

Backlash over idea to use 'brain dead' women for surrogate pregnancies

"There is no obvious medical reason why initiating such pregnancies would not be possible"

www.cosmopolitan.com

I actually have no idea what the dilemma is in that story. If someone consents to having their body used for surrogacy in the event of brain death, how is that any different than organ donation? Where is the issue?

You don't see how this could get messy? For now we base a lot of rights on birth but that whole argument will be harder (impossible?) to stick to when we allow foetal development/"gestateling" growth ex utero.

I see how it gets messy, just not how it gets messier than today. Right now we do not base rights at birth (at least not in the US). Right now (and under Roe) we assign some rights to the unborn. Especially in Texas. Right now pro-lifers have this exact messy problem staring them in the face. They're confronting all of the various nuances and problems introduced by NOT drawing the line at birth, and it is very messy.

Right now, birth is convenient. But we're opting not to use that in many cases, and going with a much more difficult problem. Because the very people that are pushing that are lacking the tools to properly analyze the problem, it's turning out to be a complete cluster and lots of people are being hurt in the process.

For your ectogenesis example, things get more difficult for anyone wanting to draw the line at birth. But it's not more difficult than it already is for anyone not drawing the line there.

 

[TexRex]

 

[HenrySwanson]

I don't see why we "proceed on ethics from there". There is no semantic trick that's going to work here. What you're arguing is that there is something morally significant about a single cell, and you're trying to do it without point out what the significance is. Instead, you're appealing to conventions or other creatures, or inheritance. Anything except what it actually is, because as best I can tell you have absolutely no real reason why there is something morally significant about a single cell. I can tell because you've not even tried to explain that.

You can't define your way out of this. You can't convention your way out of it. You need to address the problem head-on, which is that it's a single cell and there's nothing morally significant about it. The problem you keep running into is that you have nothing to address it with.

That's the time when you need to re-think your position.

I said that it's a life, and when we start to develop it from there it's that same life but at a further biological stage. The 14 day limit is derived because of significant events at that stage, but I don't know how important it will be when we have complete ectogenesis. By saying that it is a life at fertilisation, we address what we are dealing with with a solid starting point, and base rights accordingly. Again, I don't see it being that relevant until we have advanced technology that can grow something ex-utero for many weeks/months and even then I don't believe it's going to have a right to life if placed in the machine at that stage.

Here:

That's obviously not a person in a vegetative state. So I have no idea why you'd bring that up.

I'm trying to see what your limit would be. It's relevant because, at a certain stage the foetus can:

• respond to sound
• swallow amniotic fluid
• excrete urine

Once born it will be able to make a noise (cry), and will have certain reflexes present (e.g. Moro)

I actually have no idea what the dilemma is in that story. If someone consents to having their body used for surrogacy in the event of brain death, how is that any different than organ donation? Where is the issue?

I see how it gets messy, just not how it gets messier than today. Right now we do not base rights at birth (at least not in the US). Right now (and under Roe) we assign some rights to the unborn. Especially in Texas. Right now pro-lifers have this exact messy problem staring them in the face. They're confronting all of the various nuances and problems introduced by NOT drawing the line at birth, and it is very messy.

Ah.

Was more a UK centric view, and more specifically the right to life (which I believe is given at birth, although we do have a 24 week limit on abortion so I'm not sure if that's true....)

For your ectogenesis example, things get more difficult for anyone wanting to draw the line at birth. But it's not more difficult than it already is for anyone not drawing the line there.

But isn't that the law's approach, i.e. your pragmatic solution?

What is to be the pragmatic solution after that.

 

[Danoff]

I said that it's a life, and when we start to develop it from there it's that same life but at a further biological stage.

It is a life, but it's not the same life. I have trouble seeing how you could characterize it as "the same" life in a non-arbitrary way. You're begging the question by saying that a living breathing adult human is the same life as a single cell. It should be extremely clear, especially from a moral perspective, that it is in fact not the same. There are billions of physical distinctions between an adult human and a single cell. Some of those distinctions include everything we base morality on.

The 14 day limit is derived because of significant events at that stage, but I don't know how important it will be when we have complete ectogenesis.

Yes, events occur at the 14 day limit. Also before, and also after. It was drawn there because it was considered to be well ahead of ethical concerns. It was not drawn there because someone decided that 15 days would be absolutely unreasonable ethically.

By saying that it is a life at fertilisation, we address what we are dealing with with a solid starting point, and base rights accordingly. Again, I don't see it being that relevant until we have advanced technology that can grow something ex-utero for many weeks/months and even then I don't believe it's going to have a right to life if placed in the machine at that stage.

Life begins before fertilization. It's actually a super arbitrary starting point. I feel like you've got some kind of agenda here you're trying to make fit. Why do you want to protect a single cell? What do you consider morally significant about it?

I'm trying to see what your limit would be. It's relevant because, at a certain stage the foetus can:

• respond to sound
• swallow amniotic fluid
• excrete urine

Once born it will be able to make a noise (cry), and will have certain reflexes present (e.g. Moro)

...and mice.

But isn't that the law's approach, i.e. your pragmatic solution?

What is to be the pragmatic solution after that.

The pragmatic solution doesn't really work any more after that, and you need a more nuanced approach. In the event that ectogenesis enables gestation for longer than 9 months, which it seems like it should, the line should quite possibly move later rather than earlier. 9 months is an early cutoff at a convenient time. I'd expect a more nuanced approach to yield a later date rather than an earlier one.

 

[TexRex]

I feel like you've got some kind of agenda here you're trying to make fit.

 

[HenrySwanson]

It is a life, but it's not the same life. I have trouble seeing how you could characterize it as "the same" life in a non-arbitrary way. You're begging the question by saying that a living breathing adult human is the same life as a single cell. It should be extremely clear, especially from a moral perspective, that it is in fact not the same. There are billions of physical distinctions between an adult human and a single cell. Some of those distinctions include everything we base morality on.

Yes, events occur at the 14 day limit. Also before, and also after. It was drawn there because it was considered to be well ahead of ethical concerns. It was not drawn there because someone decided that 15 days would be absolutely unreasonable ethically.

Life begins before fertilization. It's actually a super arbitrary starting point. I feel like you've got some kind of agenda here you're trying to make fit. Why do you want to protect a single cell? What do you consider morally significant about it?

Morally speaking we have to base it on biological facts - that's what my argument is (as is yours).

The fact is that it's a life from fertilisation through to death, but we shouldn't treat it the same way at every stage. I imagine if we plotted a graph where sympathy towards the organism was plotted on the y-axis with age on the x-axis we'd start at somewhere around fertilisation/implantation and it would stay at a low level until rapidly increasing just before birth/peri-natally. This would plateau at childhood and then gradually decline through adulthood, declining significantly if there was a major morbidity that affected their quality of life. Is the reason for this only cognitive ability....I don't know.

Another way of looking at it would be how we treat people who suffer an early miscarriage, and the terms used during early pregnancy. Are those based purely on the potential life (from birth/childhood etc), or is there any concern at the life at that specific moment?

...and mice.

....and the aforementioned stroke patient. Why did you seem hesitant to answer about the ethics of experimentation on that individual?

The pragmatic solution doesn't really work any more after that, and you need a more nuanced approach. In the event that ectogenesis enables gestation for longer than 9 months, which it seems like it should, the line should quite possibly move later rather than earlier. 9 months is an early cutoff at a convenient time. I'd expect a more nuanced approach to yield a later date rather than an earlier one.

And you don't think that will be messier than currently?

Would the act of birth still be relevant for those who gestated initially in a person's womb and were then transferred under this new approach?

 

[Danoff]

Morally speaking we have to base it on biological facts - that's what my argument is (as is yours).

No.

Morally speaking we have to base it on morally relevant facts, which are not inherently biological in nature. For example, artificial intelligence.

The fact is that it's a life from fertilisation through to death, but we shouldn't treat it the same way at every stage. I imagine if we plotted a graph where sympathy towards the organism was plotted on the y-axis with age on the x-axis we'd start at somewhere around fertilisation/implantation and it would stay at a low level until rapidly increasing just before birth/peri-natally. This would plateau at childhood and then gradually decline through adulthood, declining significantly if there was a major morbidity that affected their quality of life. Is the reason for this only cognitive ability....I don't know.

It's a life from before fertilization.

Sympathy toward the organism? Are you trying to suggest that people should have the most rights when they're about 2 years old? I'm fascinated but also confused by your line of thinking. Rights don't come from sympathy, otherwise probably beautiful people would have more rights than ugly people. Women more than men. Puppy dogs most of all. Cognitive ability is definitely not correlated with sympathy.

Another way of looking at it would be how we treat people who suffer an early miscarriage, and the terms used during early pregnancy. Are those based purely on the potential life (from birth/childhood etc), or is there any concern at the life at that specific moment?

People who suffer pregnancy loss suffer themselves. The concern is not for the lost pregnancy, the concern is for the loss and pain to the expectant mother - not just in terms of immediate symptoms. When people grieve, much of what they grieve is their lost expectation of the future.

....and the aforementioned stroke patient. Why did you seem hesitant to answer about the ethics of experimentation on that individual?

Because you described them as having a functioning brain? Why do you have the slightest impression that I would be ok with experimenting with someone who is cognitively present? Everything I've been arguing is that rights are based on cognitive function. You gave me an example where the brain was ok but the body was impaired and suggested I'd be ok with suspending their rights, that's the opposite of everything I've said.

And you don't think that will be messier than currently?

Not any messier than the pro-lifers have it currently, as I mentioned earlier.

Would the act of birth still be relevant for those who gestated initially in a person's womb and were then transferred under this new approach?

The act of birth is still relevant because it separates a person with rights from the fetus. Until that happens, you're talking about their body. It's not the most significant event. Probably the most significant is some kind of cognitive threshold that I'm not smart enough to discern (and as far as I know, nobody has discerned). But it is still significant that it's no longer a part of the mother.

 

[HenrySwanson]

No.

Morally speaking we have to base it on morally relevant facts, which are not inherently biological in nature. For example, artificial intelligence.

Talking about human life.

It's a life from before fertilization.

Eh, that's kinda re-treading old ground.

Sympathy toward the organism? Are you trying to suggest that people should have the most rights when they're about 2 years old? I'm fascinated but also confused by your line of thinking. Rights don't come from sympathy, otherwise probably beautiful people would have more rights than ugly people. Women more than men. Puppy dogs most of all. Cognitive ability is definitely not correlated with sympathy.

I think it's more to do with protection in a moral sense, which is something you brought up and said should be attributed based on cognition.

People who suffer pregnancy loss suffer themselves. The concern is not for the lost pregnancy, the concern is for the loss and pain to the expectant mother - not just in terms of immediate symptoms. When people grieve, much of what they grieve is their lost expectation of the future.

I've always wondered when it's a loss of the life separate from the pregnant person. Do the parents of the 1 day old grieve differently from the one who suffers a late miscarriage at 19 weeks? Is the sympathy from others only towards the parent(s) and the expectation of that life?

Because you described them as having a functioning brain? Why do you have the slightest impression that I would be ok with experimenting with someone who is cognitively present? Everything I've been arguing is that rights are based on cognitive function. You gave me an example where the brain was ok but the body was impaired and suggested I'd be ok with suspending their rights, that's the opposite of everything I've said.

How are they different to the foetus and mouse? How would their brain be classed as "functioning" compared to the foetus's.

The act of birth is still relevant because it separates a person with rights from the fetus. Until that happens, you're talking about their body. It's not the most significant event. Probably the most significant is some kind of cognitive threshold that I'm not smart enough to discern (and as far as I know, nobody has discerned). But it is still significant that it's no longer a part of the mother.

This is where I'm getting confused.

With partial and complete ectogenesis the difference is going to be whether there was gestation in a human at any stage. I'm not quite clear if you're saying both of the things in the machines should have different rights, or if it should be permissible to experiment on/terminate both if they haven't reached some "cognitive threshold".

 

[Danoff]

Talking about human life.

...this is circular then. Biological facts are important because biological facts are important. My whole point is that morality is based otherwise, and the point of the discussion is morality, not biology.

Eh, that's kinda re-treading old ground.

Well then stop trying to shoehorn in an arbitrary definition where there doesn't need to be one.

I think it's more to do with protection in a moral sense, which is something you brought up and said should be attributed based on cognition.

Totally, so why did you start talking about sympathy? Sympathy is what makes us care, but how sympathetic we are does not determine rights.

I've always wondered when it's a loss of the life separate from the pregnant person. Do the parents of the 1 day old grieve differently from the one who suffers a late miscarriage at 19 weeks? Is the sympathy from others only towards the parent(s) and the expectation of that life?

I'm sure there are some crazy people that are concerned about the death of a fetus for the sake of the fetus at the moment. But generally to the degree that you're thinking about the unborn at all, you're either grieving the loss of the expectation of the future yourself, or you're sympathizing with the person who is grieving it.

How are they different to the foetus and mouse? How would their brain be classed as "functioning" compared to the foetus's.

...uh... you said they could say "screw you". I've never heard either a mouse or a fetus say that.

This is where I'm getting confused.

With partial and complete ectogenesis the difference is going to be whether there was gestation in a human at any stage. I'm not quite clear if you're saying both of the things in the machines should have different rights, or if it should be permissible to experiment on/terminate both if they haven't reached some "cognitive threshold".

I'll try to make it as simple as possible.

The unborn are not functioning on a cognitive level that confers them with rights, at least not any rights that we wouldn't confer on a mouse (or tree). Even though you're talking about an entity that doesn't (or shouldn't) have rights (at least not beyond those of a mouse), it still matters whether that entity is attached to someone who does have rights. Are we talking about a mouse that belongs to someone or a mouse that does not? If you're experimenting on a fetus inside a woman, you're experimenting on a part of her body.

 

[HenrySwanson]

...this is circular then. Biological facts are important because biological facts are important. My whole point is that morality is based otherwise, and the point of the discussion is morality, not biology.

Well then stop trying to shoehorn in an arbitrary definition where there doesn't need to be one.

But it's the very opposite of arbitrary - as shown by what biologists think when asked the question.

Totally, so why did you start talking about sympathy? Sympathy is what makes us care, but how sympathetic we are does not determine rights.

I'm sure there are some crazy people that are concerned about the death of a fetus for the sake of the fetus at the moment. But generally to the degree that you're thinking about the unborn at all, you're either grieving the loss of the expectation of the future yourself, or you're sympathizing with the person who is grieving it.

Perhaps I need an example to illustrate what I'm talking about.

There's a fire in a paediatric ward and, sadly, all children from a day old to 1 year old die.
Fire in another ward where all the patients in ectogenesis machines die at various stages of gestation.

Are they both a tragedy?
At what point do we mourn the loss of life and it not be contingent on certain circumstances (and no, I'm not talking about life-limiting diseases - imagine all those who died were gestating normally)?

...uh... you said they could say "screw you". I've never heard either a mouse or a fetus sa that.

No, but you've heard a mouse squeak and a baby cry - how is a guy who can only say "screw you" any different? I've based this example on a real patient but realised I didn't give more of the details (apologies as I just stuipidly assumed you knew what such a presentation might look like) so I'll say imagine that the words are devoid of any meaning - i.e. it's just a verbal action that the patient says at random moments - we don't actually know if he's saying "screw you" to anyone or anything.

Using the MoCA he would score a zero, and he is occasionally violent with staff when they reposition him or attend to his daily needs.

I'll try to make it as simple as possible.

The unborn are not functioning on a cognitive level that confers them with rights, at least not any rights that we wouldn't confer on a mouse (or tree). Even though you're talking about an entity that doesn't (or shouldn't) have rights (at least not beyond those of a mouse), it still matters whether that entity is attached to someone who does have rights. Are we talking about a mouse that belongs to someone or a mouse that does not? If you're experimenting on a fetus inside a woman, you're experimenting on a part of her body.

There is no pregnant person in the scenario anymore - the one undergoing partial ectogenesis has been delivered and the one with full was never in one. What I think you're saying is they both shouldn't have rights until that cognitive threshold, and both are fair game for treatment in the same manner as a mouse. Correct? Would delivered babies requiring no external support have to meet this minimum age/measure too?

 

[Danoff]

But it's the very opposite of arbitrary - as shown by what biologists think when asked the question.

...meaning what?

Perhaps I need an example to illustrate what I'm talking about.

There's a fire in a paediatric ward and, sadly, all children from a day old to 1 year old die.
Fire in another ward where all the patients in ectogenesis machines die at various stages of gestation.

Are they both a tragedy?
At what point do we mourn the loss of life and it not be contingent on certain circumstances (and no, I'm not talking about life-limiting diseases - imagine all those who died were gestating normally)?

If a puppy dies it's a tragedy. What does this have to do with the conversation?

No, but you've heard a mouse squeak and a baby cry - how is a guy who can only say "screw you" any different?

Well it definitely can be different.

I've based this example on a real patient but realised I didn't give more of the details (apologies as I just stuipidly assumed you knew what such a presentation might look like) so I'll say imagine that the words are devoid of any meaning - i.e. it's just a verbal action that the patient says at random moments - we don't actually know if he's saying "screw you" to anyone or anything.

Using the MoCA he would score a zero, and he is occasionally violent with staff when they reposition him or attend to his daily needs.

I don't really know enough about this to comment. If he's attacking the staff he may be guilty of crimes anyway.

There is no pregnant person in the scenario anymore - the one undergoing partial ectogenesis has been delivered and the one with full was never in one. What I think you're saying is they both shouldn't have rights until that cognitive threshold, and both are fair game for treatment in the same manner as a mouse. Correct? Would delivered babies requiring no external support have to meet this minimum age/measure too?

Well that is yet another pragmatic threshold isn't it - when a fetus no longer requires external support?

The answer is that everyone who can't reach a cognitive threshold (adults, children, babies, fetuses, mice, puppies, single cells) all of them are fair game for treatment in the same manner as a mouse (or tree, depending on what threshold we're talking about).

 

[HenrySwanson]

The answer is that everyone who can't reach a cognitive threshold (adults, children, babies, fetuses, mice, puppies, single cells) all of them are fair game for treatment in the same manner as a mouse (or tree, depending on what threshold we're talking about).

That's what my agenda is.

It's easy enough when dealing with black and white (e.g the zygote and the brainstem dead adult) but what happens with the grey cases, of which there will be many?

Look at the trouble the stroke patient is causing and they don't even have the same favourable long term outlook as the healthy foetus/gestateling/baby.

Leaving it up to "smarter people" doesn't seem a great solution.

 

[Exorcet]

Unfortunately that currently means that both sensible gun control and publicly accessible healthcare are beyond democracy. The needs of modern society are the complete opposite of what was given to us and most of us don't want to keep it. We can't get rid of stupid rights and we can't gain one's we need. Progress is being blockaded by a bunch of moonshiners with dirty feet and it's really bending us over.

Late to this, but it's only true if an all or nothing stance is taken. If we hold the position that universal healthcare from the government with mandatory participation is not up for a vote, that doesn't prevent a form with voluntary participation from being created. The same goes for gun control. A lot can be done even if you don't have contributions from everyone in the population. There may be short comings to this approach but I think it needs to be seriously considered more often. It could allow us to get past political grid lock and actually get things done in a timely manner.

 

[Danoff]

That's what my agenda is.

It's easy enough when dealing with black and white (e.g the zygote and the brainstem dead adult) but what happens with the grey cases, of which there will be many?

Look at the trouble the stroke patient is causing and they don't even have the same favourable long term outlook as the healthy foetus/gestateling/baby.

Leaving it up to "smarter people" doesn't seem a great solution.

It is literally what we do with adults right now. If your brain is not functioning well enough to observe the rights of others, you end up incarcerated or institutionalized in some fashion. You don't get all of your rights until you're 21 in the US (actually there's one more held back until age 35). There are many ways to be institutionalized for a poorly functioning brain (a brain that leaves you a risk to others) and absolve you of some of your rights. Elderly care facilities, hospitals, mental facilities, prisons, jails, juvenile detention, tracking equipment, automotive breathalyzers.

If your brain is not up to the task, you lose at least some of your rights. If your brain is REALLY not up to the task, you might be put to death or have a plug pulled. It's not a question of who is "smart". It's more a question of whether you can understand others.

 

[HenrySwanson]

It is literally what we do with adults right now. If your brain is not functioning well enough to observe the rights of others, you end up incarcerated or institutionalized in some fashion. You don't get all of your rights until you're 21 in the US (actually there's one more held back until age 35). There are many ways to be institutionalized for a poorly functioning brain (a brain that leaves you a risk to others) and absolve you of some of your rights. Elderly care facilities, hospitals, mental facilities, prisons, jails, juvenile detention, tracking equipment, automotive breathalyzers.

If your brain is not up to the task, you lose at least some of your rights. If your brain is REALLY not up to the task, you might be put to death or have a plug pulled. It's not a question of who is "smart". It's more a question of whether you can understand others.

While this is correct, we don't do what you're proposing regarding how a life is treated (specifically talking about death and experimentation here) except in extreme circumstances where it is very much black and white. Even the technically grey cases attract controversy. Instituting a cognitive threshold may sit uneasily with many people since the human in question doesn't have a pathology nor a poor prognosis and is only considered "inferior" due to their developmental stage.

There's a world of difference between withdrawing life support and injecting potassium chloride into something's veins.

If a puppy dies it's a tragedy. What does this have to do with the conversation?

Equivalency.

If I cut down a tree that's memorable to someone it, too, could be a tragic incident, but it's not on the same scale as a ward of children dying.

My point is, why would we be upset if both of those groups of humans perished, and would it be to a similar degree.

 

[Danoff]

While this is correct, we don't do what you're proposing regarding how a life is treated (specifically talking about death and experimentation here) except in extreme circumstances where it is very much black and white. Even the technically grey cases attract controversy. Instituting a cognitive threshold may sit uneasily with many people since the human in question doesn't have a pathology nor a poor prognosis and is only considered "inferior" due to their developmental stage.

...and this is what we do with children right now... for this very reason.

Equivalency.

If I cut down a tree that's memorable to someone it too could be a tragic incident, but it's not on the same scale as a ward of children dying.

My point is, why would we be upset if both of those groups of humans perished, and would it be to a similar degree.

If you're talking about a human that is the neurological equivalent of a tree, I don't know exactly where that is on the development scale. Maybe early 2nd trimester? Why would people be upset? Because people grieve a lost vision of the future, as I explained earlier. What they were expecting to happen (fully grown adults or children with lives and stuff) didn't happen. This is very much why humans care, but it's also not what rights are based on. We don't base your rights on what might happen in the future. Otherwise you have no right to life, for example, because you might have a heart attack or stroke and die any second.

 

[HenrySwanson]

...and this is what we do with children right now... for this very reason.

But, as far as I understand it, you are saying this is wrong?

If you're talking about a human that is the neurological equivalent of a tree, I don't know exactly where that is on the development scale. Maybe early 2nd trimester? Why would people be upset? Because people grieve a lost vision of the future, as I explained earlier. What they were expecting to happen (fully grown adults or children with lives and stuff) didn't happen. This is very much why humans care, but it's also not what rights are based on. We don't base your rights on what might happen in the future. Otherwise you have no right to life, for example, because you might have a heart attack or stroke and die any second.

Would there be a difference between the 35 week old in an ectogenesis machine and a 34 week old infant living with minimal assistance in NICU if both died (talking about the reaction of those not directly emotionally invested in each case)?

 

[Danoff]

But, as far as I understand it, you are saying this is wrong?

No.

Would there be a difference between the 35 week old in an ectogenesis machine and a 34 week old infant living with minimal assistance in NICU if both died?

I'm not sure how to answer that without more information. I think you're trying to ask if I think one of them must morally have rights (such as a right to life) while the other does not. The answer I'd give you is that a 34 (or 35) week old infant is not morally required to have rights. Certainly in our society there are animals that have more cognitive abilities and a better claim to rights than a 35 week old human infant, and we generally deny them rights (including a right to life). So at the very least it is morally inconsistent.

For example, a 2 year old dog without a home may get euthanized, and has a far better claim to rights.

 

[HenrySwanson]

No.

I'm not sure how to answer that without more information. I think you're trying to ask if I think one of them must morally have rights (such as a right to life) while the other does not. The answer I'd give you is that a 34 (or 35) week old infant is not morally required to have rights. Certainly in our society there are animals that have more cognitive abilities and a better claim to rights than a 35 week old human infant, and we generally deny them rights (including a right to life). So at the very least it is morally inconsistent.

For example, a 2 year old dog without a home may get euthanized, and has a far better claim to rights.

I'm not following here and it may be due to the difference in how we are defining "children".

In your opinion, is the premature infant not a child?

If that is the case, does that mean if I rephrased the question to ask about babies/infants you would give a different answer?

 

[Danoff]

I'm not following here and it may be due to the difference in how we are defining "children".

In your opinion, is the premature infant not a child?

If that is the case, does that mean if I rephrased the question to ask about babies/infants you would give a different answer?

No it wouldn't.

I explained earlier, several times, that there are many reasons why we deny rights to human children and even adults. These reasons all come down to how well their brain works.

 

[HenrySwanson]

No it wouldn't.

I explained earlier, several times, that there are many reasons why we deny rights to human children and even adults. These reasons all come down to how well their brain works.

We do deny in specific circumstances....but what I was asking (if it wasn't clear) was about the normally developing infant.

As far as I know no country would deny them a right to life.

I think we established birth as the demarcation for pragmatic reasons, but I inferred from your posts that there should instead be a "cognitive threshold" that makes no distinction between the unborn and born (and whatever a gestateling would be classed as).

 

[Danoff]

We do deny in specific circumstances....but what I was asking (if it wasn't clear) was about the normally developing infant.

As far as I know no country would deny them a right to life.

I think we established birth as the demarcation for pragmatic reasons, but I inferred from your posts that there should instead be a "cognitive threshold" that makes no distinction between the unborn and born (and whatever a gestateling would be classed as).

Yes because those same cognitive reasons also apply to fully grown adults, as I mentioned a moment ago.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Yes because those same cognitive reasons also apply to fully grown adults, as I mentioned a moment ago.

Hold on a minute.

Specifically talking about life, currently we only do that when there is an irreversible pathology (excluding the death penalty). That's what my previous post explained, which you responded to with:

...and this is what we do with children right now... for this very reason.

Which I took to mean as that we currently protect children without an extreme pathology that affects certain areas of their brain in law. Was that not what you meant?

 

[Danoff]

Hold on a minute.

Specifically talking about life, currently we only do that when there is an irreversible pathology (excluding the death penalty). That's what my previous post explained, which you responded to with:



Which I took to mean as that we currently protect children without an extreme pathology that affects certain areas of their brain in law. Was that not what you meant?

No. What I was saying is that we institute a cognitive threshold with children. We offer additional rights to brains that are additionally developed.

A 1-year-old has a right to life, but not a right to make their own medical decisions, own property, own a gun, vote, drink alcohol, drive a car, get married, work, view pornography. Etc.
A 16-year-old has a right to life, can under certain circumstances get married, drive a car, and in rare circumstances make their own medical decisions and own property, but cannot own a gun, vote, drink alcohol, work certain hours or jobs, and view pornography.
A 21-year old still can't run for president.
An 18-year-old felon can't vote (at least for a time).
An 18-year-old who has committed a crime can have their freedom of movement taken away. But this is restored after a time period under the premise that this time period will somehow fix whatever was wrong with their brain and they'll be able to function again.
An 18-year-old who has committed the specific crimes of pedophilia or drunk driving may have certain rights taken away even while generally released. For example, tracking or vehicle restrictions.
An 18-year-old who has committed other specific crimes may lose their right to life.
In some states, at some ages, under the right conditions, your right to suicide is recognized.
In some states, at some ages, under the right conditions, your right to take certain drugs is recognized.

For all of the above, a lack of mental health (other than the criminal lack of mental health) also can result in a reduction of corresponding rights.

The point here is that brain development is the key to obtaining rights in society. Our entire structure of rights is centered around cognitive capability. Whether you're an adult, a child, an infant, none of it is particularly germane to whether you have rights. What matters is whether your brain can be presumed to function well enough to function reciprocally. Specifically, does your brain enable you to recognize that other people have the same rights and expectations that you do, and enables you to treat them according to this reciprocity. If it does not, we logically do not confer those same rights to you.

 

[HenrySwanson]

No. What I was saying is that we institute a cognitive threshold with children. We offer additional rights to brains that are additionally developed.

A 1-year-old has a right to life, but not a right to make their own medical decisions, own property, own a gun, vote, drink alcohol, drive a car, get married, work, view pornography. Etc.
A 16-year-old has a right to life, can under certain circumstances get married, drive a car, and in rare circumstances make their own medical decisions and own property, but cannot own a gun, vote, drink alcohol, work certain hours or jobs, and view pornography.
A 21-year old still can't run for president.
An 18-year-old felon can't vote (at least for a time).
An 18-year-old who has committed a crime can have their freedom of movement taken away. But this is restored after a time period under the premise that this time period will somehow fix whatever was wrong with their brain and they'll be able to function again.
An 18-year-old who has committed the specific crimes of pedophilia or drunk driving may have certain rights taken away even while generally released. For example, tracking or vehicle restrictions.
An 18-year-old who has committed other specific crimes may lose their right to life.
In some states, at some ages, under the right conditions, your right to suicide is recognized.
In some states, at some ages, under the right conditions, your right to take certain drugs is recognized.

For all of the above, a lack of mental health (other than the criminal lack of mental health) also can result in a reduction of corresponding rights.

The point here is that brain development is the key to obtaining rights in society. Our entire structure of rights is centered around cognitive capability. Whether you're an adult, a child, an infant, none of it is particularly germane to whether you have rights. What matters is whether your brain can be presumed to function well enough to function reciprocally. Specifically, does your brain enable you to recognize that other people have the same rights and expectations that you do, and enables you to treat them according to this reciprocity. If it does not, we logically do not confer those same rights to you.

Apologies for late response.

The right to life is an exception to this (at least in nations without the death penalty). From a bioethical view the salient point is the quality of life, which can be that human's current state or their long term future. Treating it like other human rights, by tying it to cognition, ignores the inherent value of a human life and opens the door to places I don't think many societies would be comfortable going to. A major principle in medical ethics is that of beneficence, and terminating a healthy life that isn't infringing on someone else's would, in my opinion, contravene it - as may experimentation in certain circumstances.

I'm interested why you think of the stroke patient as passing a cognitive threshold but seem fine with a newborn not making it? And also your thinking process around answering the question of gene editing humans to take out pain receptors. Would you have been as reticent if it were mice?